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Inheriting Kinship: Norwegian Holiday Property as Relational Practice  
 
Simone Abram   
 
Abstract  
This chapter approaches inheritance as a form of intergenerational gift, with reference to 
anthropological theories of exchange and kinship. In doing this, it considers a particular kind 
of property, the Norwegian holiday home, and the distinctive practices attached to its use and 
inheritance. The chapter shows how the holiday home attracts a particularly acute role in 
family relations during the process of inheritance from parents to children, and illustrates 
how legal concepts are adopted from one arena and applied to another.  
  
Introduction1i 
This chapter approaches Nordic inheritance by bringing together perspectives on property, 
ownership and legal process in the special case of Norwegian holiday homes or ‘hytte’, often 
translated as ‘cabin’. Cabins offer insights into the management of testamentary obligations 
and freedoms between family members, and into the way that legal concepts are adopted from 
one legal arena and applied in another; that is, legal forms from another area of the law are 
reproduced in relation to cabin-inheritance through a creative transference of popular 
inheritance concepts.  
                                                 
1  I am grateful to Prof Sarah Blandy for her insights and suggestions and for key references in socio-legal 
studies, and to the editors for their comments. The article also draws on material from a research project funded 
by the Norwegian Research Council, entitled ‘Materializing Kinship: Cycles of Life at the Norwegian Hytte’ 
(project number: 250837/F10). 
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 It is also worth paying attention to cabins in Nordic contexts due to their relative 
abundance. There are approximately 450,000 holiday homes in Norway,2 in a population of 
around 5.25 million, including around 2.3 million households,3 suggesting one holiday home 
for every five households. Given that a family in the broad sense (both extended families and 
what Simpson calls ‘unclear families’4) may include several households, it has been suggested 
that around every other Norwegian family at least has access to such a holiday home.5 Related 
to these cabins, a range of practices is understood to constitute what is often called a ‘cabin 
culture’ with distinct ideals and norms related to outdoor life, simple living and family 
togetherness.6 Cabins also have a special status in Norwegian property and planning 
regulations and have thus come to occupy a separate housing market. For various reasons, 
they have come to occupy a slightly different place in the practice of inheritance, as they have 
accrued a wide range of moral and affective meanings among Norwegian families, as this 
article will outline. 
 Cabins are domestic spaces where family gather to share leisure time, outside the ‘normal’ 
everyday routine of working life. They are a place to be at home that is, nevertheless, not the 
family’s main home. The family that gathers at the cabin may not live together on a daily 
basis if, for example, it includes adult children, highlighting various paradoxes and nuances in 
                                                 
2  SSB (Statistisk sentralbyrå) 2017a. Fritidsbyggområder, 2015 https://www.ssb.no/natur-og-
miljo/statistikker/fritidsbyggomr/aar (accessed 10.4.17). 
3  SSB 2017b. Nøkkeltall for befolkning. https://www.ssb.no/befolkning/nokkeltall/befolkning (accessed 
10.4.17). 
4  B. Simpson, “Bringing the ‘Unclear’ Family Into Focus: Divorce and Remarriage in Contemporary 
Britain,” Man n.s., 29, no. 4 (1994): 831-51. 
5  J. M. Denstadli, Ø.Engebretsen, R. Hjorhol, and L.Vågane, Den nasjonale reisevaneundersøkelsen 2005 – 
Nøkkelrapport, TØI rapport 844/2006 (Oslo: Transportøkonomisk institutt (TØI), 2006). 
6  See Gunnar Vittersø, “Norwegian Cabin Life in Transition,” Scandinavian Journal of Hospitality and 
Tourism 7, no. 3 (2007): 266–80; Simone Abram, “The Normal Cabin’s Revenge: Building Norwegian 
(Holiday) Home Cultures,” Home Cultures 9, no. 3 (2012): 233-56.  
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the relationship between family and home in a Norwegian context. These nuances can often 
emerge in the form of emotional tensions when cabins come to be inherited, and some of the 
solutions found for resolving inheritance conflicts adopt principles that are known from 
Nordic legal history, even though they are no longer included in laws on inheritance 
applicable to these kinds of property, as I will show. The inheritance of cabins therefore 
illustrates how arcane forms that are no longer legally applicable may be reproduced through 
private contracts, if not through inheritance law. Looking at this from another perspective, 
sharing, passing on or losing a cabin from the family can be seen as significant ingredients in 
the performance of kinship for many Norwegian families. As English property scholars have 
usefully noted, property itself can be defined as ‘a network of dural relationships between 
individuals in respect of valued resources’.7 Hence, the approach adopted by Finch and Mason 
in their study of British inheritance applies equally here: ‘in examining how families handle 
inheritance, our focus is not so much on the property as on the relationships.’8  
 
Inheritance As Making Relations through Property 
As highlighted in the introductory chapter in this book, inheritance can be seen as one of the 
means by which kinship relations are not merely utilized, but actually generated, reproduced 
or maintained. Inheritance can be understood as a form of trans-generational gift, playing the 
role understood in anthropological theory as materializing relationships.9 Acts of giving and 
receiving are understood in anthropological theories of exchange as the embodied enactment 
                                                 
7  K. Gray and S. F. Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 6. 
8  Janet Finch and Jennifer Mason, Passing On: Kinship and Inheritance in England (London and NY: 
Routledge, 2000), 2.  
9  See Annette B. Weiner, Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-While-Giving (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992).  
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of relations that are otherwise conceptual.10 Gifts are understood not merely to reflect existing 
relations, or to embed existing relations in material form, but actually to be the material that 
gives substance to relations themselves. In the simplest sense, giving a gift creates an 
obligation, or places the giver and receiver in an imbalance of power, hence the need for the 
receiver to give a gift in return, a ‘counter-gift’, perhaps on a subsequent occasion, thereby 
occasioning the basis for an ongoing relationship.11 In giving and receiving material things, 
we thus enact relationships and put into motion a range of personal and material relations.
 Giving and receiving as the basic elements of any exchange relation carry a range of 
obligations and emotional entanglements, and the moments of exchange carry some risk. If 
the giving and receiving is unsatisfactory, or if the thing given is inappropriate, then the 
relations themselves can be endangered rather than consolidated. Giving and receiving 
personal gifts is as tricky and risky as commercial exchange, with less legally codified 
regulation to secure redress if the exchange is found wanting. 
 
Inheritance As Gifts  
The special case of giving and receiving in relation to death raises particularly vivid moments 
of fragility, as relations are inevitably subject to upheaval at this moment. Normatively 
affective ties of kinship come under strain at moments of great change, and the death of kin is 
one of the most significant moments of transition in many lives. The one-sided feature of the 
exchange – since no return gift is possible – lends emotional weight to this kind of gift, 
changing its character. Inheritance often combines purely financial with material interests, and 
this balance between money and goods lends to the tension associated with the gift and poses 
                                                 
10  See Karen Sykes, Arguing with Anthropology: An Introduction to Critical Theories of the Gift (London: 
Routledge, 2005). 
11  Marcel Mauss, The Gift (London: Cohen and West, 1954).  
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difficulties for the receiver that may be both financial and emotional. As Finch and Mason 
note, the financial value of an inherited object may bear little relation to its emotional 
resonance, and even the putting of a price on such an item may threaten to undermine the 
emotional value that the gift entails.12 
  The Norwegian legal, moral and social imperative to distribute inheritance equally 
between offspring leads to an expectation that the total bequest must be valued financially in 
order to be divided fairly, and this quantification of the inheritance is often understood to 
imply a quantification of the relationships it entails. Such quantification of what are otherwise 
understood to be emotional ties is often a source of tension, and in some societies the notion 
of quantifying the value of relationships is considered inimical, if not unthinkable.13 The 
anthropological record is also full of instances of wrangling over money associated with 
relationships. Marriage dowries, for example, mix finance and kinship in sometimes-
explosive tension. While dowries have been consigned to history in much of Western Europe, 
a rise in interest in ‘prenuptial agreements’ and popular media stories of celebrity divorce 
settlements suggest that, even in the Nordic countries, there is significant ambivalence about 
the mix between affect and commerce. The heightened emotional resonance of shared family 
property and belongings adds to the familial anxiety that can be produced by the inheritance 
of cabins. 
  One reason why inheritance of property is so charged is the perdurance of the material 
objects being inherited. This simple fact carries significant emotional and moral obligation, 
since the transfer of ownership is rarely complete. As Weiner has detailed, gifted objects 
                                                 
12  Finch and Mason, Passing On.  
13  See P. Rivière, “The Amerindianization of Descent and Affinity,” L’Homme 33, nos. 2-4 (1993): 507-16; F. 
Santos Granero, The Power of Love: The Moral Use of Knowledge Amongst the Amuesha of Central Peru 
(London: The Athlone Press, 1991). 
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retain symbolic value based on the history of their ownership, and items owned by famed or 
cherished relatives carry value to the new owners.14 As Selmer points out, in the case of 
inheritance, this inalienability is sustained beyond death, carrying symbolic associations 
around the relations between kin and between generations.15 Finch and Mason also show how 
inheritors make active moral decisions related to bequests, wondering what the testator would 
have done with it.16 Such decisions are particularly symbolically loaded in relation to personal 
items, where they are made complicated by the kin relations associated with the bequest. In 
this context, a cabin can be seen as a single item that is inherited, but also as a collection of 
items that may or may not be divided amongst inheritors. 
  The process of inheritance, involving the negotiation of financial and familial relations in 
the context of heightened emotional tension, is inevitably associated with moments when the 
two worlds of financial transaction and gift-exchange collide; where the emotional and 
financial worth of material things can throw relations into new perspective, relations can be 
both made and unmade. In the context of property, it is important to note that Norwegian 
property law allows for joint ownership of property (unlike English law, for example), 
enabling the possibility that a number of people might jointly inherit a property. Generally, of 
course, it is not only kin who inherit from each other, since the range of possibilities in wills 
and testaments is broad. In the case of cabins, however, it is extremely rare that non-kin 
inherit; hence, the drive of this chapter concerns the question of which kin member(s) should 
inherit and the implications of the answers to this question.  
 
Norwegian Inheritance 
                                                 
14  Weiner, Inalienable Possessions. 
15  Selmer, B. [You need the full reference here, and you also need to ensure you add it to the bibliography.]  
16  Finch and Mason, Passing On.  
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The significance of cabin inheritance is related to the important symbolic and cultural value of 
‘Home’ as a frame for people’s lives in the Norwegian context.17 Marianne Gullestad 
highlights the role of the Norwegian home as a form of self-expression of its inhabitants, and 
as an expression of core elements of Norwegian cultural life, including individual and family 
identities, security, ‘peace and quiet’, autonomy, self-sufficiency, carefulness and mastery, 
and of love relations between spouses.18 She also argued that these priorities constituted 
modes through which national sentiment was generated, such that referring to ‘Norwegian 
homes’ is a specific and meaningful categorization, not merely a convenient agglomeration.19ii 
The cabin takes on many of the attributes of the home described by Gullestad, as families 
project the cabin in particular as a place to ‘be together as a family’,20iii often more so than in 
the hurly burly of everyday life. Time at the cabin carries a sense of ‘time out’ or ‘quality 
time’, a place to long for and enjoy as a simple indulgence.21iv 
 The enhanced focus on the cabin as both arena and product of family life lends further 
emotional freight to discussions about how a cabin should be passed on. Such questions are 
not merely discussed within the family, but have a cultural life, such as in the frequent 
appearance of the topic in popular magazines. The desire for advice highlights the leeway 
offered by the law in making testamentary arrangements. It is this leeway that lends the law 
                                                 
17  Eilert Sundt, Om sædelighetstilstanden i Norge (Oslo: Pax, 1857/1968); Eilert Sundt, Om huslivet i Norge 
(Christiania, 1973). 
18  Marianne Gullestad, Kultur og hverdagsliv på sporet av det moderne Norge (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 
1989). 
19  Significant minorities such as the Sámi arguably adhere to a separate nation whilst being full Norwegian 
citizens. Immigration has also brought different traditions, as Gullestad herself was at pains to emphasize. These 
complex and contested issues are not addressed here. It should be read as implicit that ‘Norwegian’ is a term 
relating to nationalism, not a descriptive category. 
20  As described in field research among Norwegian cabin owners. 
21  See Garvey, “The Norwegian Country Cabin and Functionalism”, for a discussion of the cabin’s place in 
Norwegian modernity. 
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such significant social interest, since, as Cotterell puts it, the law is “an aspect or field of 
social experience, not some mysteriously external force acting on it”.22 Many property 
theorists similarly conceive of law as a persuasive narrative that shapes how we see the 
world,23 providing a conceptual frame for the everyday, while necessarily being performed as 
‘a set of practices’.24  
 Nordic systems of split or joint ownership are baffling for those used to an English 
system which fixes only one person (be it corporate or private) as the owner of a thing.25 In 
contrast, Nordic law’s recognition of co-ownership of property among an unrestricted number 
of persons has more in common with French law, which also proceeds on the basis of partible 
inheritance. Perhaps unsurprisingly, tensions over shared inheritance of holiday property 
found in France show marked similarities with those outlined in this chapter. 
 
How Does the Cabin Gather Kinship around It? 
It is clear from preliminary fieldwork that I have carried out in Norway in recent yearsv that 
concern over the transmission of built property (dwellings) is particularly acute in relation to 
cabins, much more than over primary residences or other property.26 The first response I 
                                                 
22  R. Cotterell, Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Society (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 
25. See also A. Pottage, “Introduction: The Fabrication of Persons and Things,” in Law, Anthropology, and the 
Constitution of the Social: Making Persons and Things, ed. A. Pottage and M. Mundy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 1-39. 
23  C. M. Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory and Rhetoric of Ownership (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994). 
24  N. Blomley, “The Borrowed View: Privacy, Propriety and the Entanglements of Property,” Law and Social 
Inquiry, 30, no. 4 (2005): 617-61, at p. 656. 
25  See T. Honoré, “Ownership,” in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, ed. A. G. Guest (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987: 107-47). 
26  Fieldwork has included visiting cabins in different parts of the country, attending national cabin-policy 
conferences, and interviewing solicitors about their approach to advising clients about inheritance, as well as 
9 
receive when talking to Norwegians about inheriting a cabin is usually: “oh, so many 
feelings”. Lawyers whom I interviewed about inheritance contracts speculated that this is 
because cabins are more likely than primary homes to be inherited (since they do not attract 
the requirement to reside: ‘boplikt’). But they also recognized the deep emotional attachment 
to places associated with childhood pleasure – a cabin being so often the place where families 
spend time together, both indoors and outside ‘in nature’, repeatedly over many years. 
Knowing every stone and every blade of grass is often the source of deeply felt nostalgia, 
which may be especially important in the light of increasing transnational movement and 
uprooting, as Lien and Melhuus suggest.27 It is also the place where these experiences are 
shared with close family, embedding the association between family and cabins. 
  At the same time, the labour required to maintain a cabin is, for many, an ambivalent part 
of the attachment to the cabin itself. While primary residences also require maintenance, it 
may not be controversial to propose that cabins seem to require inordinate amounts of work. It 
may simply be a function of the limited time spent at a cabin if the time spent on maintenance 
of a property is considered constant, and may also reflect the likelihood that maintenance of 
the primary residence is more likely to be carried out by hired professionals. But it is also 
clear that, as Klepp has argued, that cabin maintenance and cabin building are part of the 
leisure experience, and provide a particular opportunity for the playing out of gendered and 
family identities, with building work being considered a particularly male business, for 
example.28 Children join the ‘community of practice’ that is the cabin family and learn 
                                                                                                                                                        
consulting selected case notes. Work with solicitors was primarily carried out in 2011 – prior to the abolition of 
inheritance tax. 
27  M. E. Lien and M. Melhuus, Holding Worlds Together; Ethnographies of Knowing and Belonging 
(Oxford: Berghahn, 2007). 
28  I. G. Klepp  “Hytta som leilighetens mannlige anneks,” in Den mangfoldige fritiden, ed. Asbjørn Klepp 
and Liv Emma Thorsen (Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal AS, 1993), 46-56. 
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through a kind of apprenticeship – or what Lave and Wenger call ‘situated peripheral 
participation’ – what is expected of them as a caring member of the family and what is 
expected in relation to caring for the cabin.29 They thus learn to be members of the cabin-
family, taking on moral ownership of (or membership in) the cabin as one form of their kin 
relationship to the other members. Through giving time, labour and love to the cabin, family 
members gain a kind of moral ownership of it while confirming kinship ties to each other, and 
by default negating kin relations with family members who do not participate in cabin life, or 
do not participate in the ways expected by other members of the family. 
 
Inheritance As a Moment of Instability in Kin Relations 
After long involvement with the cabin, the question of inheritance attracts particular attention 
and provides an arena for the articulation and negotiation of kinship and other relations. At 
the point of inheritance, decisions must be made about which sibling inherits which share of 
which property, according to a paradoxical framework of egalitarianism and hierarchy. 
Norwegian inheritance law stresses both the importance of ‘branches’ of a genealogical tree, 
but also includes equality between full siblings. A by-product of the principle of sibling 
equality is to perpetuate distinctions between step-siblings, half-siblings and full siblings, 
despite the emphasis that many ‘blended’ families put on treating all of the children in a 
family equally. Inheritance thus highlights social norms of Norwegian kinship that are less 
explicitly discussed in practice. 
 Inheriting a cabin may provoke disagreements between siblings and affines over 
questions such as whether the cabin is to be inherited by a single beneficiary, or whether 
                                                 
29  Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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sharing-rights are included in the inheritance (see below). However, as increasing numbers of 
families own cabins, and often multiple cabins, tensions may arise not only in relation to 
competing desires to inherit cabins. The significant maintenance that cabins require can 
become a burden in terms of both money and time, sometimes leading to disagreements and 
disputes about whether to dispose of a cabin, or over who might prefer not to inherit. 
 There is no doubt that managing inheritance has been a significant tax issue in the past 
for some families, although the recent removal of inheritance tax has undoubtedly changed 
this situation. Arranging the succession of property before a death may have as an alibi the 
need to plan for tax reasons, but in practice, the solicitors I interviewed argued that it is as 
much about ensuring the smooth transition of kin relations as it is about finances. In other 
words, inheritance demands both legal and emotional facilitation. But it also entails moral 
framing, since there are clearly shared understandings about preferable ways to distribute 
cabin rights and property, in a national context. The legal consciousness approach helps to 
explain how rights such as those related to odel, which are not applicable to cabin property, 
are reproduced (or at least mimicked) in private contracts of sale, applying an ancient legal 
principle in a new arena, and generating legal innovation through practice rather than through 
legislation.30 
 Two legal features related to housing are useful to have in mind when considering 
inheritance practices of holiday homes, beyond the fact that inheritance law does not give 
anyone rights to inherit a holiday home per se. The first relates to a situation where inheritors 
receive a bequest in joint ownership – under the law on joint ownership, or ‘sameieloven’. 
Under this arrangement, any one owner of a shared property may sell their share. This share 
must be offered to the other members of the joint ownership agreement, who may choose to 
                                                 
30  Knut Dørum, this volume. 
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buy the share belonging to the selling party. This must normally be done at market price. In 
areas of high demand where cabin prices can be extremely high, or where co-owners do not 
have finance available, the remaining owners may be unable to afford the additional share, 
forcing them to sell the cabin outright. Thus, parents who leave a cabin to a group of siblings 
may risk the cabin leaving the family altogether if the different financial positions of the 
siblings mean that those left cannot afford to pay those who wish to sell up. This provides 
another reason why legal and financial advisers recommend against leaving cabins shared 
between siblings, and particularly where the financial situations of these siblings differs 
significantly. 
 A second set of legal categories separates usage rights and ownership rights, giving rise 
to complex patterns of possible ownership and access to cabins, which can be mapped onto 
changing concepts of the family, and highlights the blurred boundaries between conventional 
and new forms of kinship and affinity, as discussed later in the article. 
 As one of the solicitors interviewed explained, parents may feel torn over passing on the 
cabin to just one of their children, while acknowledging that dividing rights between several 
siblings through shared ownership could quickly see the cabin in the hands of numerous 
owners (second cousins in the next generation, for example). The more owners involved, and 
the more distantly they are related (either by kinship or familiarity), the more likely they are 
to disagree on how to manage the cabin, raising the risk of discord. Discord is precisely what 
these legal and financial advisers aim to avoid, so their advice is often driven by this concern. 
 A solution that is often recommended by advisers is for the parents to say that one of their 
children should inherit the cabin, but that they must tolerate that their siblings have use-rights 
(‘bruksrett’), for example, for as long as they live (although these rights may also be inherited 
further). Such a solution is a fairly common way to smooth the transition between generations, 
13 
and between a couple and one of their several siblings. Ownership of the cabin in these cases 
will be defined in a specific contract, detailing the various ownership and usage rights 
associated with the cabin. Quite fine details can be included in this type of inheritance 
agreement (even to the degree of who brings in firewood, or how often the cabin should be 
painted), which may be organized well in advance of the actual handover of the estate, the 
‘boskifte’.  
 
Gifts As Relational Vehicles, Gifts Disguised As Sales  
A common vehicle to arrange this has been to take the inheritance out of a will and make a 
contract of sale of the cabin from parents to child(ren), often as the parents retire and consider 
their financial situation. Until the abolition of inheritance tax (op. cit.), a common solution 
was to ‘sell’ the cabin to the inheritor at an agreed price, in a contract that stipulated that the 
seller (for example, the parents) retained four weeks use per year, that is, the maximum 
allowed for the sale to be considered a genuine transfer of ownership (under inheritance tax 
rules). Each year, the value of the gift decreased in its liability for inheritance tax (according 
to the exemption rules for gifts over time), while allowing the parents to guarantee their 
continued use of the cabin. In such contracts, actual dates may be specified (“every other 
Easter holiday” or “a fortnight in July with two further weeks by arrangement”, for example). 
In drawing up such contracts, legal advisers aim to solve or avoid conflict, talking clients 
through the options and encouraging them to find a solution that will lead to the minimum 
conflict in the long term. The recent abolition of inheritance law means such arrangements are 
not strictly necessary, but according to professionals I have spoken with, the pattern of 
contracts has not significantly changed.  
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 The solicitors and financial advisers whom I spoke to all advised against shared 
ownership, even though some were participants in shared ownership arrangements themselves. 
As a rule, however, each saw shared ownership as the source of potential conflict, and their 
own role as seeking conflict avoidance. Instead, they recommended that single ownership of 
the / a family cabin by one party could be compensated financially through the sale of other 
items or properties in the family estate, and compensated affectively by maintaining access to 
the cabin for use by the non-owning siblings, thus separating the financial and affective 
fallout of changing ownership while acknowledging that both have meaning for kinship 
relations. 
 The instigation of such arrangements (the private sale, the sharing of different rights, use 
or ownership) and the changing practices they imply (changing habits of gathering at the 
cabin) still represent a potential destabilizing of the practices of family relations. The potential 
for one sibling to inherit ‘more’ than another, or to inherit different kinds of rights to the cabin, 
carries a potential threat to the principle of sibling equality. Such moments must be handled 
carefully, the potential inequality must be compensated, and the family must find a way to 
adjust to a new set of kin / cabin arrangements. Where this fails, it can lead to long-lasting 
family rifts, with siblings losing contact with one another or cousins cutting each other off. 
 The dilemma of how to pass on a cabin without threatening convivial family relations 
thus encourages parents to plan such transitions in advance, in the hope that any perceived 
injustice can be addressed or resolved, rather than festering through further generations. The 
great dilemma lies in this paradox, that forcing siblings to share a cabin equally may dissipate 
the value to each of them of the cabin (in terms of access), while limiting the liberty of each 
sibling to make choices about the cabin (decisions over maintenance or improvements, or 
15 
whether to retain or sell it). Siblings are thus forced into an enduring relationship as long as 
the cabin remains in their joint ownership. 
 Yet financial compensation to siblings who do not inherit if a cabin goes to only one 
among them is only a partial form of compensation. As mentioned above, money for emotion 
is not a comfortable moral equation in this context – indeed the emotional force of financial 
transactions is heightened in family relations precisely because each item inherited carries 
with it the approbation, rejection or moral obligations that characterized the relationship 
between the parents and their children, alongside the history of sibling relations that one 
financial adviser described as inevitably fractious to some degree.31  
 
New Family Forms – New Conflicts  
But there are other ways in which such a simple equation becomes more complex while 
reflecting changing family relations among Norwegian families. It is important to note that 
testamentary freedom in Norwegian inheritance law is restricted.32vi Two-thirds of the total 
bequest must be shared equally between direct beneficiaries – usually the children of the 
deceased – up to a limit of one million Norwegian kroner, in a rule known as Leks 
Mikkelsen.33vii Hence, at least one-third of the total bequest can be left to whomever the 
testator wishes. Given the general increases in property values, and the decrease in the value 
of the kroner, one million kroner is often a minor fraction of the total bequest, leaving 
                                                 
31  See also Simone Abram, “Values of Property (Properties of Value): Capitalization of Kinship in Norway,” 
Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change 12, no. 3 (2014): 1-14; and M. Bloch, and J. Parry, “Introduction: 
Money and the Morality of Exchange,” in Money and the Morality of Exchange , eds. J. Parry and M. Bloch 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1989), 1-32. 
32  For example, in comparison with the complete testamentary freedom under British law; see Finch and 
Mason,  
33  After Christian Mikkelsen, prime minister at Norway’s independence in 1905. 
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increased freedom in practice. Where the cabin falls within the testamentary obligation, or 
where an owner dies intestate, the bequest will follow a route down the branches of the 
genealogical tree, where the primary beneficiaries are children, grandchildren, then great-
grandchildren. Where there are no children, the next rank of beneficiaries are parents, or via 
the parental relationship to the deceased’s siblings, or their children, or if there are neither 
parents nor siblings, then via the grandparents to cousins through the generations. However, 
each time a bequest passes down a generation, it should be split equally between any siblings. 
Hence, there is a system that prioritizes parental relations between generations and sibling 
equality within generations. To illustrate that this is not a ‘natural’ system, it is worth noting 
that, for example, parents do not bequeath automatically to their own siblings – it is only their 
offspring whose sibling relationship is significant. Nor is a deceased’s parents the primary 
inheritor if the deceased has children. The law, in other words, urges parents to pass on their 
worldly goods primarily to their children, and that in equal measure between them. The 
significant exception to this rule relates only to the inheritance of working farms or forestry, 
which comes under odel regulations that prioritize the eldest child, who gains particular rights 
to inherit the whole property. Norway thus has two inheritance systems in place, one for 
working farms / forests, and another for private property. In this chapter, I will not address 
odel in detail, except where it appears through conceptual borrowing.  
 Where a cabin has been left to one of a number of siblings (rather than shared between 
all), then at the second or third generation, this leaves a cabin in the hands of a ‘branch’ of the 
family. When the owner marries, the cabin can be held outside of the marriage as ‘særeie’ 
rather than forming part of the shared property of the marriage. In principle, any marriage 
partner can take out of the marriage whatever they brought into the marriage, either in the 
case of divorce or widowhood. Hence, if a couple divorce and remarry new partners, or if the 
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spouse brings other children into the marriage, these will not stand to inherit the cabin, since 
only the owner’s full legal children (biological or adopted) have the right to inherit this 
property.  
 The system really starts to become complex in ‘unclear families’34 that include multiple 
parents – that is, where there are step-siblings and half-siblings.35viii In the first instance, if I 
own a cabin, and my children’s other parent marries for a second time and gains stepchildren, 
only my prior children will inherit my cabin since it is held as særeie. If I remarry and have 
further children with my new spouse, these children will share the rights to the cabin with my 
prior children, unless my testament explicitly states otherwise. Any new stepchildren (that is, 
my new spouse’s children from a former partner) will have no rights to the cabin, even if they 
spend all of their childhood holidays there alongside the other children in the family and 
continue to enjoy regular family time there with or without other siblings.  Norwegian 
law has a peculiarity that tempers the brutality of this division by postponing its effects. When 
one spouse dies, the other may continue in what is known as ‘uskiftet bo’, or unimplemented 
inheritance. In other words, the act of inheriting is postponed until the second spouse dies, at 
which point the inheritance proceeds as though both had died simultaneously. However, a part 
of the inheritance may be implemented outside this procedure. For example, for a couple who 
have children from other marriages, those children may receive their minimum inheritance 
(currently up to 1m kroner) when their parent dies. Any further share of inheritance can sit in 
the unimplemented bequest until their step-parent dies, at which point all children will inherit 
equally, with the early inheritors receiving their share minus the minimum inheritance they 
received earlier.  
                                                 
34  Simpson, “Bringing the ‘Unclear’ Family into Focus.”  
35  Adopted children do not complicate anything per se from a legal perspective, since they are 
straightforwardly their parents’ children in the eyes of the law. 
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 The system includes a particular anomaly, though. Normally, if a spouse dies, the 
children inherit two-thirds of the bequest, and the widow/er inherits one-quarter (leaving one-
twelfth as a sort of wiggle-room). If the spouses have unequal wealth, then this quarter may 
be worth a different amount depending on which spouse dies first. The cabin may be a 
property of lesser value than the main home, so its route though inheritance could well fall 
into the third of the bequest that is free from testamentary obligation. However, where this is 
not the case (whether because the cabin is particularly valuable, or it forms a large part of the 
total bequest), the proportion of the cabin shared between a spouse and stepchildren may vary. 
For example, if the surviving spouse inherits from the deceased spouse, s/he may become the 
sole owner of the cabin. In that case, joint children and the separate children of the surviving 
spouse inherit equally from him or her, meaning that separate children inherit a smaller share 
if their parent dies before their step-parent. Without going into all the details of possible 
scenarios, it is worth noting here that anomalies are possible and can be the focus of concern 
when devising testaments or cabin ownership arrangements.  
 As mentioned, each spouse may retain property that s/he owned prior to the marriage, 
inherited or received as a gift during the marriage from someone other than the spouse. 
Property may also be kept outside the marriage agreement, as ‘separate property’ (‘særeie’). 
Cabins retained as ‘særeie’ in the marriage may be inherited by testament outside the 
marriage too, so that a parent may keep a cabin with their separate child(ren) in mind, who 
may then inherit the cabin directly without it first being inherited by the surviving spouse. 
Although any property brought into the marriage or inherited or received as a gift during the 
marriage can be taken out of the marriage at divorce, the complication arising, which most 
often prompts court cases or divorce disputes, is the contribution of the spouse to the value of 
the property during the marriage. If the spouse has decorated, done maintenance, built any 
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improvements, and so on, then their efforts earn them the right to half of the value of any 
improvements undertaken throughout the marriage. Calculating the value of such 
improvements, particularly over long periods, is a matter of opinion (even of expert opinion) 
and, as such, is a common cause of conflict. Such conflicts are most visible during divorce 
rather than inheritance cases, but can easily become an issue at inheritance where, for 
example, a divorced spouse has an unregistered partner (i.e. with no formal civil partnership) 
who has participated actively in cabin life, perhaps over many years.  
 If a spouse keeps his / her family’s cabin as separate estate in a second (or generally 
subsequent) marriage as ‘særeie’, it becomes more likely that it will continue in the line of 
kinship of their own parentage (their ‘branch’), and will not come into the (shared) ownership 
of their stepchildren. This is often understood as a ‘natural’ progression of ownership along 
lines of kinship rather than alliance (that is, through marriage). The point here is to 
demonstrate how inheritance of a cabin may paradoxically reinforce the inequality of step-
siblings who are otherwise considered equal within the family’s everyday relations, yet at the 
point of inheritance are marked as different.  
 
Old Inheritance Laws, New Practices  
Given the complexities and potential anomalies noted above, creative responses can be found 
in the testaments and other contracts that people make in relation to cabin inheritance. 
Particularly notable is the practice of adopting arrangements that are either historic legal 
features or are part of laws not relevant to this field, for example, the ‘borrowing’ of legal 
ideas from odel that are concerned with keeping landholdings undivided within one family 
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branch (as indicated above). As noted, odel is not applicable to cabinsix,36 but the ideal of odel 
rights has a popular force such that similar principles are brought into cabin inheritance and 
can be found specified in both contracts of sale that anticipate inheritance (outlined above) 
and in testaments. Various kinds of ‘forkjøpsrett’, that is, priority purchase rights derived 
from odel practice, are practiced particularly in relation to cabins (as mentioned above). If 
parents leave a cabin to one offspring, they may include rights for another, or all others, to 
have the right to buy the cabin if the owner wishes to sell it, and this may be either as a right 
of first refusal, or as a right to step in once a sale price has been agreed with a potential 
purchaser and demand to buy at the agreed price. From a comparative perspective, such rights 
introduce a degree of risk into the property market for potential purchasers. 
  In the ‘first refusal’ scenario, the rights-holders and owner are usually advised to seek a 
valuation from a surveyor. If there is disagreement, a common means of resolution is to 
appoint a second surveyor and fix the price halfway between the two valuations. The parties 
may then conduct a private sale, keeping the transfer of the cabin under control rather than 
opening it up to the market. But siblings may not adopt such a ‘reasonable’ approach since, as 
a specialist financial adviser put it to us, people think with their heartx.37 Even if the process is 
followed carefully and correctly, siblings may reflect back on their childhood and suspect that 
they have not been treated fairly, causing arrangements to collapse, or generating mistrust. If 
the right is implemented in the midst of a sale to a third party, it may disrupt carefully laid 
plans by sellers and lead to resentment of the claiming party. The choice of clause in such a 
contract can thus have considerable impact on the ongoing relations between family 
members.  Interestingly, it is extremely rare for such cases to come to court. Some 
                                                 
36  Odel applies to agricultural land over 25 hectares and productive forestry over 500 hectares. See Lov om 
odelsretten og åsetesretten (odelslova) https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1974-06-28-58 (Accessed 06.01.16). 
37  Or in the Norwegian idiom, they ‘react with their stomach’. 
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informants suggested to us that this was simply because such a case would pit sibling against 
sibling, and in a relatively non-litigious country, most Norwegians are reluctant to sue close 
family members over something that may be primarily of sentimental value. Rifts over cabins 
may well lead to siblings cutting off contact with one another, but a court case would, we are 
told, most certainly lead to an enduring rift within a family.  
 
Cabins in Court  
One of the very few cases to have come to court in recent years was reported at Agder 
Lagmanssrett (county court)xi and concerned the ambivalence surrounding preferential 
treatment of ‘natural’ offspring over step-siblings.38 The case is a little complicated, but offers 
an illustration of the kinds of tensions that can emerge between kinship and commerce.   
 According to the case records, a property named ‘Nygaard’ was sold at auction to Roald 
Risdal in 1971 for 17,000 Norwegian kroner. Roald was then thirteen years old, and the 
property was bought on his behalf by his father, Olav, partly using money given to Roald by 
his mother as a gift in advance of inheritance. At the same time, she gave an equal gift to her 
two sons from a previous marriage. The family (Olav, Anne and Roald) then used Nygaard as 
a holiday home. Eleven years later, when Roald was twenty-four, he sold the property back to 
his father for 50,000 kroner with an agreement which stated that ‘the buyer and seller agree 
that the seller, Roald, has forskjøpsrett if the property is sold by Olav, or on inheritance, at the 
same sales price of 50,000 kroner plus documented expenses’.   
 Olav died in 2000, and his wife, Anne, took over his estate. When she later died in 2009, 
she left her estate not only to Roald, but to three inheritors from her previous marriage: one 
                                                 
38  Kristiansand tingrett TKISA-2011-35071 – Agder lagmannsrett LA-2011-150884 (11-150884ASD-
ALAG). 
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son and two grandchildren by a deceased son. As part of the inheritance process, Roald 
wished to exercise his right to buy back Nygaard according to the odel-like agreement he had 
made with his late father. The other three inheritors went to court to object to the arrangement. 
The court decided that Roald should have the right to buy Nygaard for 200,000 kroner, and 
that each of the other three should pay case costs of 52,000 kroner each to Roald. This 
judgement effectively forced each one to contribute around 50,000 kroner net, thereby 
introducing some element of equality between the inheritors. The three other inheritors 
appealed on the basis that Roald and Olav’s agreement was invalid, since the property was 
registered to Olav and he was the de facto owner. Roald was only thirteen when the property 
was bought and had no income, and it was his parents who paid for the property. Hence, they 
argued, Olav had bought the property in the interests of his son and at the cost of the rest of 
the family. Roald, they argued, had never really owned the property and hence should not 
have the right to claim it.   
 Roald’s lawyer argued that the appeal should be thrown out, since Roald was recognized 
as the owner by the authorities (at the land registry) when Olav bought the property, which 
was partly financed by an advance of his inheritance from his mother. As an adult, Roald had 
contributed to the maintenance of the cabin, paying the ongoing expenses associated with the 
property in the form of a deduction from his salary from his father’s company, where he 
worked. It appears that Roald and Olav had shifted the ownership of the cabin to keep it 
outside their family business, to ensure that it could not be lost as collateral if the business 
failed. To some extent, the dispute thus swung between inheritance law and contract law, but 
questions about the relationship between father and son, indeed between parents and son, 
come into the legal ruling about the son’s right to the benefits of inheritance. 
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 According to the record of the case, the court accepted Roald’s solicitor’s argument that 
the dispute did not relate to who should own the property, but how much it was worth. This 
argument removed questions of affect and family closeness and reduced it to a question of 
financial justice. In his view, the law could only judge whether Roald should be able to buy it 
from the estate for the price agreed in the contract or at the current market price estimated by 
a surveyor to be  900,000 kroner at the time of the death of Anne. Much of the case revolved 
around the real or market value of the property at the time of purchase, of the agreement, at 
the time of Olav’s death and then at the time of the case, after Roald’s mother’s death.   
 Within the case, it is interesting that the court notes that the relationship between Roald 
and his parents is described as close, while the parents’ relationship with Roald’s two half-
brothers was more distant, giving this affective warmth some legal significance, perhaps 
reflecting the concern that financial value in this dispute still symbolized affective value. This 
echoes comments we have heard from legal and financial advisers and from cabin owners, as 
suggested above, that it is the practical and emotional labour that family members contribute 
to the cabin that brings them greater moral ownership, but here, too, that the warm 
relationship between Roald and his parents could also influence a preferential property or 
financial settlement (that is, in contradiction to sibling equality). Roald’s mother, however, 
had clearly acted on the principle of sibling equality under inheritance when she had put the 
original 10,000 kroner into the purchase of the cabin, as she simultaneously gave 10,000 
kroner each to her other sons. One might argue that these other sons could have used their 
10,000 kroner to buy property that could have increased at the same rate, but in fact, the 
mother’s other inheritors claim that they should receive equal benefit from the rise in financial 
value of the cabin that had been bought in Roald’s name. The appeal court ruled that Roald 
did have the right to inherit the cabin, but at the current market value of  900,000 kroner.    
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 In this case, half-siblingship, equality of inheritance, cabin-property and forskjøpsrett 
come into focus. To some extent, the case illustrates the risks identified by the solicitors 
mentioned above, that inequalities or lack of clarity about ownership can lead to disputes 
between siblings over inheritance, when it is too late for the parents then to sort out any 
misunderstandings. But the case also indicates the limits to principles of sibling equality, and 
preferential or partial property rights encased in contracts. None of these rights are absolute, 
but partial in relation not only to different legal principles, but also in the light of the 
emotional qualities of the relationships between different kin. It should not be controversial to 
claim that although the ruling was about money, the case may have been just as much about 
sibling rivalry, resentment of the perceived preferential treatment of one sibling, and a 
demand for equal treatment in fact.  
 The reason for citing this case here is precisely because the dispute is over a cabin. The 
emotional attachment to the cabin, reflected in the contribution to its maintenance and in its 
frequent use, is linked to ownership rights. Roald’s frequent use and maintenance of the cabin 
may have led his parents to believe that he could exercise a right to re-purchase that was 
modelled on odel law (otherwise not applicable in this case), but the passing of the cabin to 
one offspring to the exclusion of the others may have had much to say for the motivation of 
the other inheritors to pursue the case, although we have no record of their motivations in the 
case itself. Whatever the case for this particular family, cabins can be seen to have a peculiar 
position in relation to inheritance, being much more than inert property with market value. 
Cabins become the locus of emotional investment as well as labour, and persist as the 
materialization of the relationship between parents and inheritors. Even a cabin inherited by 
one inheritor to the exclusion of all others carries with it the history of the family’s use of it, 
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the implication that sole ownership excludes others, whose absence may carry ongoing 
significance in the cabin’s future.  
 
Conclusions  
What I have proposed here is that the cabin has a particular significance in the production of 
Norwegian kinship, and that the cabin takes on a moral significance within the Norwegian 
family partly through its use (‘being together’), and partly through its changing ownership and 
its passage between kin through inheritance. What happens to the cabin matters to the family, 
possibly more than what happens to the primary home of the deceased. It matters because it 
can continue to be in the possession of the family in a particular way, especially where use or 
ownership is shared, and it matters because it is disputable, and hence often gives rise to 
conflict and to moralized normative discourses about what ‘should’ happen to a cabin 
between generations. It also matters because of the heavy moral, shared normative overtones 
of expectation of what a Norwegian cabin-family should be and what constitutes an ideal 
(harmonious, equitable) outcome.  
 Given how clearly the contracts, agreements and disputes over cabin inheritance reflect 
the moral and legal principles and practices of kinship in Norwegian society, it is important to 
pay attention to the cabin. The many means by which cabins can be inherited outside the 
system of testaments (for example, through intra-family sales or share-ownership) mean that 
future historians of Nordic inheritance could well miss the significance of cabins if they 
restrict their attention to testaments alone. And for anthropologists, it is clear that the way the 
cabins are owned, used and inherited reflects the organization of Norwegian society through 
the materialization of kinship in the body of the cabin.  Not all Norwegian families own 
cabins, of course, so it may seem odd to define a national tradition through the activities of 
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only a partxii,39 but the inheritance of cabin can be seen as a kind of synecdoche of Norwegian 
kinship practices, since it highlights the tensions and moral norms that are widely shared.  
 Further, it is apparent that Norwegian families, when working through decisions about 
how to leave cabins between inheritors, adopt principles and models from other areas of law 
related to rights of purchase, sharing of use-rights, shared ownership forms, and family claims 
inspired by odel. Different areas of law are thus woven into sometimes complex and detailed 
agreements, contracts and testaments to achieve the outcome desired by the bequeather. These 




Abram, Simone, “The Normal Cabin’s Revenge: Building Norwegian (Holiday) Home 
Cultures,” Home Cultures 9, no. 3 (2012): 233-56.  
-----, “Values of Property (Properties of Value): Capitalization of Kinship in Norway,” 
Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change 12, no. 3 (2014): 1-14. 
Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Community (London: Verso, 1983). 
Bloch, Maurice, and Jonathan Parry, “Introduction: Money and the Morality of Exchange,” in 
Money and the Morality of Exchange, ed. Jonathan. Parry and Maurice Bloch. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1-32.  
Blomley, Nick, “The Borrowed View: Privacy, Propriety and the Entanglements of Property,” 
Law and Social Inquiry 30, no. 4 (2005): 617-61.  
                                                 
39  Although, of course, this chimes with Anderson’s famous argument that the unity of the nation is in any 
case imagined; Anderson, Imagined Community. 
27 
Cotterell, Roger, Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Society (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2006).  
Denstadli, Jon Martin, Øystein Engebretsen, Randi Hjorhol, and Liva Vågane, Den nasjonale 
reisevaneundersøkelsen 2005 – Nøkkelrapport., TØI rapport 844/2006 (Oslo: 
Transportøkonomisk institutt (TØI), 2006). 
Finch, Janet, and Jennifer Mason, Passing On: Kinship and Inheritance in England (London 
and NY: Routledge, 2000).  
Garvey, Pauline , “The Norwegian Country Cabin and Functionalism,” Social Anthropology 
16, no. 2 (2008): 203-20. 
Grimstad, Ingun, “Der det er folk blir det jord. Et landskap skapt i fritid,” Dugnad 2-3 (1991): 
35-48. 
Gray, Kevin, and Susan Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009).  
Gullestad, Marianne, Kultur og hverdagsliv på sporet av det moderne Norge (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1989). 
Honoré, Tony, “Ownership,” in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, ed. A. G. Guest (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), 107-47. 
Klepp, Ingun Grimstad, “Hytta som leilighetens mannlige anneks,” in Den mangfoldige 
fritiden, ed. Asbjørn Klepp and Liv Emma Thorsen. (Oslo: [Publisher], 1993), 46-56.  
Lave, Jean, and Etienne Wenger, Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).   
Lien, Marianne, and Maarit Melhuus, Holding Worlds Together; Ethnographies of Knowing 
and Belonging (Oxford: Berghahn, 2007). 
28 
Lov om odelsretten og åsetesretten (odelslova), ). https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1974-
06-28-58 (Accessed 06.01.16). 
Mauss, Marcel, The Gift (London: Cohen and West, 1954). 
Pottage, Alain, “Introduction: The Fabrication of Persons and Things,” in Law, Anthropology, 
and the Constitution of the Social: Making Persons and Things, ed. A. Pottage and M. 
Mundy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1-39.  
Rivière, Peter, “The Amerindianization of Descent and Affinity,” L’Homme 33, nos. 2-4 
(1993): 507-16. 
Rose, Carol, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory and Rhetoric of 
Ownership. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). 
Santos Granero, F., The Power of Love: The Moral Use of Knowledge Amongst the Amuesha 
of Central Peru (London: The Athlone Press, 1991). 
Simpson, Bob, “Bringing the ‘Unclear’ Family Into Focus: Divorce and Remarriage in 
Contemporary Britain,” Man, n.s., 29, no. 4 (1994): 831-51. 
SSB (Statistisk sentrabyrå) 2017a, “Fritidsbyggområder, 2015,” https://www.ssb.no/natur-og-
miljo/statistikker/fritidsbyggomr/aar. 
SSB 2017b, “Nøkkeltall for befolkning,” 
https://www.ssb.no/befolkning/nokkeltall/befolkning. 
Sundt, Eilert, Om huslivet i Norge (Christiania, 1873).   
-----, Om sædelighetstilstanden i Norge (Oslo: Pax, 1857/1968).   
 
Sykes, Karen, Arguing with Anthropology: An Introduction to Critical Theories of the Gift 
(London: Routledge, 2005). 
29 
Vittersø, Gunnar, “Norwegian Cabin Life in Transition,” Scandinavian Journal of Hospitality 
and Tourism 7, no. 3 (2007): page spread. 
Weiner, Annette B, Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-While-Giving 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).  
 
Author Description 
Simone Abram is a Professor at the Department of Anthropology at Durham University (UK). 
She is currently co-leading a research project on kinship and property with Professor 
Marianne Lien at the University of Oslo, entitled “Materializing Kinship”. Her research 
engagement with Norway began in 2000.  
Recent publications include the monograph Culture and Planning (2011) and edited volumes: 
Green Ice: Tourism Ecologies in the European High North (2016); Media, Engagement and 
Anthropological Practice: Contemporary Public Scholarship (2015) and Elusive Promises: 















                                                                                                                                                        
x  
xi  
xii  
